The Deal Flow

The chain

Click the chain or use the buttons below

Every artifact references the previous one by hash. Tamper with any link and the chain breaks.

5 provider signaturesDescriptor, offer, quote, invoice bundle, and receipt come from the provider.

1 requester signatureThe deal is the requester’s cryptographic commitment to pay.

1 terminal proofThe receipt is the final artifact any third party can verify later.

The artifact chain is both the protocol flow and the audit log. The same objects used during execution are the objects you verify afterwards.

Message exchange

Requester ↔ Provider message flow

Watch the four-step exchange that turns a quote into a verifiable receipt.

⏸ Pause

Key insight: who signs what

Artifact	Signed by	Why
Descriptor	Provider	Declares identity
Offer	Provider	Commits to pricing
Quote	Provider	Prices specific workload
Deal	Requester	Commits to pay
InvoiceBundle	Provider	Payment instructions
Receipt	Provider	Proof of execution

The Deal is the only artifact signed by the requester — it’s their cryptographic commitment to pay. Everything else is signed by the provider.

The receipt is proof — of exactly this

Anyone holding the receipt can verify: the provider signed it, the result hash matches what the provider committed to, the recorded settlement state is internally consistent (on Lightning, attested by the payment preimage), and the chain is unbroken. What it does not prove is that the result is correct — a receipt makes outcomes attributable, not infallible. Disputes on the hosted marketplace go through an operator-adjudicated arbiter; the math fixes the evidence, not the verdict.

The signed artifact envelope

Every artifact in the chain is a JSON envelope with identity and integrity proof built in:

{
  "artifact_type": "offer",
  "schema_version": "froglet/v1",
  "signer": "02a8d6...public_key",
  "created_at": 1700000000,
  "payload_hash": "sha256_of_canonical_payload",
  "hash": "sha256_of_canonical_signing_bytes",
  "payload": { ... },
  "signature": "bip340_schnorr_signature"
}

Verification: canonicalize the payload (RFC 8785 JCS), hash it with SHA-256, rebuild the signing bytes, verify the BIP340 Schnorr signature against the signer key. If it passes, the payload is untampered and the artifact came from the holder of the private key.